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Strong resistance to a “grand theory” when exploring demographic processes is
spreading again throughout the scientific community. No doubt, a certain sense of
assertiveness that is perceptible from the statements on the Second Demographic
Transition(SDT)canjustify,asareaction,theoutrightrefusalofanyall-encompass-
ing, all-embracing theory. However, it is very hard to disagree with two major state-
mentsincludedinthatapproach:1)therecognitionoftheoverwhelmingeffectofthe
modernisation process on social practises, and 2) the acknowledgment that the
nature of modernisation is changing into postmodernism, leading to different
outcomes. But in my opinion each of these two statements needs to be better
understood.
Although the SDT theory does not seem to present itself as a “grand theory”, it
hasneverthelesstriggeredanewwaveofgeneralisedtheoreticalframeworks(candi-
dates for middle-range theories) about the ways in which fertility changes. On this
way we need to go on, looking for a recombination of these theoretical fragments to
form a more comprehensive theory, endogenously including both local settings of
the social world and different—instrumental, cognitive, normative, and affec-
tive—strata shaping individual decision-making concerning the main transition in
life (“transitional behaviour” and “transitional choices” here denote any behaviour
or choice concerning these main transitions in the life course).
Asforthefirststatement,modernisationseemstoberepresentedhereasagradu-
ally progressive process that spreads from some leading countries to a larger area.
However,Icannothelprecallingthatonthecontrary,demographicpractisesarespa-
tially embedded “lore”. Changes in family models have always acquired different
formsindifferentsettings.Uptothefinalconvergence(andmanycenturiesstillhave
to pass before the modernisation will be over) every landscape is generally path-de-
pendent.Wecanthereforeimagineamulti-polarsecularisingprocess,convergingto
uniformity with reinforcement of local characteristics within local niches.





thparallelsof northern latitude. The criticalbelt betweenthe two parallelsisa
sortofSouthernEuropeanorographicridge.Itissurprisingtonote,inthemostpopu-
lous countries of continental Southern Europe (especially France, Spain and Italy),
thecloseoverlapofthemapofareascitedbyLePlay(1984)asstem-familyareasand
the map of current fertility stagnation.
TheSouthern European orographic ridge could thereforebeseenasthebreeding
groundbothofstem-familycultureandofthedrasticchangesinreproductivebehav-
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ally embedded “lore”, overlapping Le Play’s geography of family models.
Reherreferstothisasa“pathdependency”process.Generally(evenintheeraof
globalisation) groups tend to be rooted in a territorial niche and in a subculture or
“folk-lore”: they act on “telluric” principles. Their demographic behaviour is thus
embedded in the local anthropological structures and practises, as the outcome of a
gradual sedimentation along time.
Weneedthereforetoreconstructtheanthropologicalembedmentofcurrentfertil-
ity dynamics. We can no longer avoid investigating the inertial anthropological
localismsinwhichtoday’sdemographicdynamicsareembedded.Topostulateanal-
ternativebetweenconverging ordiverging European demographic dynamicsisonly
a misleading question.





lations which is itself the end product of practises consolidated over time. But how
can we explain that, faced with such tension between resources and expectations,
various parts of the continent have used diverse adaptive strategies? What “law-like
statement” can help explain why? We must try to understand the interlock of struc-
tural conditions, rational choice, practises and norms flowing into the current
multi-polar scenario.
Elder and Caspi (1988) resort to asocialmechanismthat they defined as“princi-
pleofaccentuation”:itreferstotheincreaseinsalienceofthecharacteristicsofanin-
dividual or group that were already prominent even at the beginning of any individ-
ual or social discontinuity. With the principle of accentuation we arrive at the very
core of our second major statement. What is the logic of this “accentuation”
mechanism?
The orthodox interpretation of the current change in the demographic practises
outlines that the discontinuity hinges upon an epochal change in beliefs and value





ing values. This reduced definition of postmodernism can produce a harmful seg-
mentationinourabilitytounderstand.Inmyopinionwearefacing,onthecontrary,a
discontinuity stemming not only from a change in beliefs, i.e., not only in the
cognitive dimension, but also (or rather) from a new emerging state of mind.
Really,thenew“economicman”istheresultofalifehorizoncollapse,andsucha
collapsecannot produce butinsecurity.LetusreadagainvandeKaa:“Wehavenow
entered a period without objectives truths, in which people will continuously seek
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ject formerly self-evident truths about religion, the social order, the rights and obli-
gationsofindividuals,sexualbehaviorgenderrolesandsoon[…].Atthecostofever
moreinsecurity,[…]theirpostmodernistic outlook […]questions thefundamentals
of the meaning-giving system of modern societies” (Van de Kaa, 2001).
Van de Kaa describes a decision-making process that unfolds without a specific
object. The change from modernity to postmodernism is not the outcome of a mere
evolution ofvalueorientations. Rejectionisnotamerelycognitiveprocess,astepin
the rational decision-making process; it rather unfolds at the normative-affective
level. Two key concepts deserve our attention here. The first one is the absence/loss
of a centre or of “former truths”. The second key word is “insecurity”: a mental pro-
cess without a specific object, a state of mind produced not so much by a rising
“ontologic security risk” (Giddens, 1990) as by the perceived multiplication and
pulverisation of Lebenswelten.
Beck (1999) argues that we live in an increasingly risk-conscious society: a con-
sciousnessperfectlycoherentwiththerationalchoiceparadigm.Howeverwecannot
do without facing the extraordinary ambiguity of the concept of risk perception: if
we ask ourselves why our perception of (and aversion to) risks is on the rise, we can
findatleasttwopossibleanswers.Riskperceptioncanrisepartlybecausetheobjec-
tive uncertainty is growing (exogenous explanation), and partly because of a rising
anxiety without specific object (endogenous explanation).
Now the post-materialist values theory, associated with the SDT approach, ex-
plains the growth in risk perception asan ideational change, i. e., a change in beliefs
and values. Nevertheless, unlike attitudes and beliefs, moods are non-intentional
mental processes, which means they are not “about” something.





ideational change). It is rather a new stage of modernity where the concealed face
of the “accentuation of individual autonomy and self-actualisation” is emerging.
We can now pose the second question from the start in a new way: is the change
frommodernisationtopostmodernismtheoutcomeofamereevolutionofvalueori-
entations, or rather, as confirmed by influential representatives of twentieth-century
socialscience,aswitchintheunderlying moods?Andhowtoexplain, then, thecur-
rent trend of delaying life course transitions in Southern Europe?
Theprevailingrationalchoicemodel(anditsfamilisticvariantaswell)maintains
that the shift of transitional choices into a region of legitimate indifference lets the
declaredexpectationsbecounteredbythecostsofthetransition,whichareperceived
to be high. The delay of life course transitions follows as a rational decision. Never-
theless,theinconsistencybetweentherationalcost-benefitbalancingandtheprefer-
encesandnormslearnedbysocialinfluencewouldallegedlybereducedbychanging
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denceinMediterraneancountries(althoughwedonothaveaccesstoadequatelongi-
tudinal data). So, this first hypothesis is not as robust as we usually suppose.
I believe it is more useful to hypothesise that there are some states of mind inter-




just an ex-post rationalisation to reduce the dissonance between expectations and
actual behaviour.
The discrepancy between the set of internalised norms and consistent behaviour
would therefore derive from positing the existence of a mechanism of interposition
in the expectation-behaviour sequence, as well as an interceptor in a cerebral syn-
apse:asortofmechanismwhichcannotbeidentifiedinthecognitiveconstructsgen-
erallytakenintoaccount.Itisasif“antagonist”mediatorsinterposedthemselvesbe-
tween the decisions and the stratification of awareness upon which the system of
preferences and expectations is based, as happens in the processes of endocrine
communication.
Indeed, the crucial demographic choices of a life course are often “decisions not
tochoose”:thereisnodirectlinkbetweenresultandintention,andthecompletionof
the transition from preferences to action requires a release of control exercised by
reason. The rarefaction of procreative behaviour may then be read as the result of a
mechanism of interception between the preference system and the decisions: some-
thinglikethrowingouttheclutch,whichmakesitimpossibletomakeavehiclemove
forward, however desperately we put our foot down on the accelerator (Micheli,
2004).
Thishypothesisdoesnotatallexcludetheexistenceofabroadrangeofstructural
factors—economic, sociological and anthropological—which aredetermining ones
for inducing the most recent generations to make self-delimiting reproductive
choices, interpreted as “rational” choices. This hypothesis resolutely denies the
self-sufficiency of the main neo-classical interpretations.
Moreover,myclaimtoasystematicinclusionofthedispositionalstatesinadeci-
sion-makingworkingmodelmaynotbecircumscribedwithinthebordersofaMedi-
terranean “too sensitive and anxious” (too “momist”) society. On the contrary I be-
lieve that, as per Elder’s accentuation principle, every local system of norms, values
and social practises (i.e., every local culture) has its own breaking point when ex-
posed to environmental pressure; and that we have to open our analysis to a larger
range of age-normative transitions in a life-course. Translating this hypothesis into
the Coale-Lesthaeghe bottleneck model (where a precarious choice requires readi-
ness, willingness and ability all together) would imply to simply add a fourth
element, a sort of disposition to risk.
In 1672, four years before his Essay on political arithmetic, William Petty pub-
lished another essay he named Political anatomy of Ireland. The switch from anat-
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Unlikeanyotherdiscipline,medicineatthetimehadalreadydevelopedamethodfor
evaluating the different states of the human body, and for the global comprehension
of every symptom by taking into account the whole bulk of all other symptoms.
The aim of Petty’s 1672 essay was, correctly, to try to somehow synthesise all
characteristicsofthedynamicsofthe“politicalbody”(whichweusuallyfragmentin
thesocial,economic,politicalanddemographicpopulationdynamics).When-Petty,
afew years later, substituted arithmetic to anatomy in his own tool box, he wasable
to catch—at the very dawn of its apparition—the heuristic turning point of the
emerging quantitative analysis in the exploration of the political body. Nevertheless
today,aswehavewelldevelopedthepotentialofquantitativeanalysis,wemayhave
reason to go back to 1672 once more, contributing to the wealth of analytical ap-
proach the meaningfulness of the semiotic method, and introducing a more
comprehensive, global sense to population dynamics (Micheli, 2003).
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